Vol. 3, Issue 2, Part A (2021)

Abstract: Ryle tells us that knowing how does not involve knowing that. Knowing how to perform a task does not require a prior knowing that in the sense of avowing to oneself certain propositions about what is to be done. The champions of the traditional theory had, according to Ryle, interpreted knowing how in terms of knowing that by arguing that intelligent performance involved a double operation of considering appropriate propositions internally and executing them publicly. But the important point, according to Ryle, is that in the case of knowing how, we are not having knowledge of this or that truth but simply displaying the ability to do dertain sorts of things. He observes: "When a person is described by one or other of the intelligence- epithets such as 'shrewd', or 'silly', 'prudent' or 'imprudent', the description imputes to him not the knowledge, or ignorance, of this or that truth, but the ability, or inability, to do certain sorts of things'. In order to defend such a view, he contrasts knowing how with knowing that. The contrast becomes evident when he declares: "It should be noticed that the boy is not said to know how to play, if all he can do is to recite the rules accurately.